House: On Passage: H R 3269 Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act
Date: July 31, 2009 Chamber: House Type: On Passage Question: On Passage: H R 3269 Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act Ayes: 237 Nays: 185 Result: Passed Roll Call Details
House: On Motion to Recommit with Instructions: H R 3269 Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act
Date: July 31, 2009 Chamber: House Type: On Motion to Recommit with Instructions Question: On Motion to Recommit with Instructions: H R 3269 Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act Ayes: 178 Nays: 244 Result: Failed Roll Call Details
House: On Agreeing to the Amendment: Amendment 2 to H R 3269
Date: July 31, 2009 Chamber: House Type: On Agreeing to the Amendment Question: On Agreeing to the Amendment: Amendment 2 to H R 3269 Ayes: 179 Nays: 244 Result: Failed Roll Call Details
House: On Agreeing to the Amendment, as Modified: Amendment 1 to H R 3269
Date: July 31, 2009 Chamber: House Type: On Agreeing to the Amendment, as Modified Question: On Agreeing to the Amendment, as Modified: Amendment 1 to H R 3269 Ayes: 242 Nays: 178 Result: Agreed to Roll Call Details
Veterans’ Benefits: Benefits Available for Disabled Veterans
Although U.S. Armed Forces are deployed around the globe, a number of servicemembers are currently serving in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) combat zone. As a result of the risks facing these servicemembers, some of them are incurring injuries or illnesses during their active service (or having existing medical conditions worsen as a result of their service). Congress has shown an interest in the treatment of injured servicemembers while undergoing medical treatment and their transition from military to civilian life as veterans. An injured servicemember (or veteran) may require specific types of assistance or benefits to enable him or her to have a better quality of life. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits for veterans. However, certain benefits have specifically been created to assist disabled veterans. Disability compensation provides a monthly cash benefit to veterans whose disabilities resulted from injury or disease contracted in or aggravated by military service. The amount is based on the level disability. The Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program is designed to help veterans with service-connected disabilities prepare for, find, and keep suitable jobs. Assistance is also available to help veterans with living skills. Automobile and special adaptive equipment grants are available to certain disabled veterans and servicemembers to purchase new or used automobiles (or other conveyances) to accommodate a disability. Clothing allowances are designed for certain veterans entitled to receive compensation for a service-connected disability for which he or she uses a prosthetic or orthopedic device. Housing grants are provided for constructing an adapted home or modifying an existing home to meet the adaptive needs of certain veterans and servicemembers. There are three grant programs available for permanent residences, and two of the three grant programs are also available for temporary residences. Service Disabled Veterans' Insurance (S-DVI) is life insurance for veterans who have received a service-connected disability rating by the VA. This report provides information on these benefits, including eligibility, history, and the application process. Information regarding spending and the beneficiaries of these benefits is in the Appendix to this report. This report will be updated as new information becomes available.
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency. In the north, the government of Uganda has long fought the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), an armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million and resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In 2006-07, the government of Uganda and the LRA have been actively engaged in an effort to resolve the conflict peacefully. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has been mediating the talks since June 2006. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In February 2008, the parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire, amended the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, and Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions. However, the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, failed to show up for the final signing of the agreement on a number of occasions. Kony and his forces are in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The cessation of hostilities has allowed an estimated 400,000 displaced people to return to their homes. In June 2007, the parties signed an agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. In late October, a LRA delegation went to Kampala for the first time and held talks with senior Ugandan officials. In October, Vincent Otti, the Deputy Commander of the LRA, reportedly was killed in Uganda by Joseph Kony, the head of the LRA. Over the past several months, a number of senior LRA commanders have surrendered to authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda. In late October 2007, President Museveni visited Washington, D.C. and met with President Bush and other senior administration officials. President Museveni also met with several Members of Congress. During his visit, President Museveni discussed a wide range of issues, including U.S.- Uganda relations, the crises in Somalia and Darfur, trade, and HIV/AIDS. Uganda deployed an estimated 1,800 peacekeeping troops to Somalia, shortly after Ethiopian forces invaded Mogadishu and installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Ugandan forces have not been a major target of the insurgents in Mogadishu, although a number of Ugandan peacekeepers have been killed over the past several months.
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget over $1 billion per year across three agenciesDOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russias willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the Presidents ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union. This report will be updated as needed.
The Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009
The House and the Senate approved H.Rept. 111-89, the conference report to accompany S.Con.Res. 13, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2010, on April 29, 2009. The FY2010 budget resolution includes reconciliation instructions directing the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the House Committee on Education and Labor to report changes in laws within their jurisdictions to reduce the deficit by $1 billion for the period of fiscal year (FY) 2009 through FY2014. The reconciliation instructions for the House specifically direct the Committee on Education and Labor to report a bill that invests in education while reducing the deficit by $1 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period. On July 21, 2009, the House Committee on Education and Labor marked up H.R. 3221, the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009; and on July 27, 2009, the committee reported H.Rept. 111-232 to accompany H.R. 3221. H.R. 3221 would terminate authority under the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, as amended, to make loans under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program after June 2010. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this would reduce mandatory or direct spending by $41.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $86.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. These savings would be large enough to achieve the $1 billion reduction in spending specified in S.Con.Res. 13, while offsetting increases in mandatory spending that would result from the expansion of several existing HEA programs, and the establishment and funding of several proposed new programs. Overall, CBO estimates that H.R. 3221 would reduce mandatory spending by $13.3 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $7.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. CBO also estimates that enactment of the proposals made in H.R. 3221, if fully funded, would increase discretionary spending by $3.6 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $13.5 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. In addition to terminating the authority to make loans under the FFEL program, H.R. 3221 would fund expansions of several existing HEA programs and benefits, including the Federal Pell Grant program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program, programs serving Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority-Serving Institutions, and the College Access Challenge Grant program, and would alter procedures for determining the eligibility of students for need-based federal student aid. H.R. 3221 also would establish several new programs under the HEA, including a new Veterans Educational Equity Supplemental Grant Program, a new Federal Direct Perkins Loan offered through the DL program to replace the current Federal Perkins Loan program, and a College Access and Completion Innovation Fund. Several major non-HEA programs would also be established and funded by H.R. 3221. These include a series of Modernization, Renovation, and Repair grant programs for school facilities, an Early Learning Challenge Fund to support early childhood education, and an American Graduation Initiative to support community colleges. This report reviews and briefly describes the proposals contained in H.R. 3221 to amend programs authorized under HEA and to establish and fund additional new education programs. It will be updated as warranted to track legislative developments.
Daily Schedule
FRIDAY, JULY 31, 2009 House meets at 9:00 a.m. Five One Minutes per side. H.R. 3269 – Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 (Rep. Frank – Financial Services) Amendments Structured Rule, One Hour of Debate Rule Y ✓ N Sessions (TX) Motion to Recommit H.R. 3269 MTR Y 178 N 244 Passage Y 237 N 185 H.R. 3435 – Making supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Program. (Suspension) Y 316 N 109 P 2 Special Orders: Republicans have the first hour.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues
One of the most serious challenges facing Afghans and Afghanistan today remains the lack of security. Recent moves by the Taliban and other insurgents to reestablish control of some areas of the country have slowed the pace and extent of economic development and the expansion of the Afghan government, an essential part of the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan. The United Nations has had an active presence in Afghanistan since 1988. Since the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, international donor activity and assistance has been coordinated primarily through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), though there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghan government. Most observers agree that continued, substantial, long-term development is key, as is the need for international support, but questions have been raised about aid effectiveness (funds required, priorities established, impact received) and the coordination necessary to achieve sufficient improvement throughout the country. In March 2009, the Obama Administration unveiled its overall strategy for Afghanistan as a top national security priority and highlighted the unsatisfactory status of progress to date and need to find a way forward. Congress has focused on Afghanistan as a critical concern during the first six months of the 111th Congress. The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated and, in coordination with the Afghan government, involves U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, international organizations, and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The international community and the Afghan government have sought to establish coordinating institutions and a common set of goals in order to use donor funds effectively. The international donor community has put great emphasis on Afghan fiownershipflŠmeaning leadership and controlŠof reconstruction and development efforts by the country itself. Although the Afghan government is taking on an increasingly central role in development planning and the management of aid funds, the international community remains extensively involved in Afghan stabilization, not only in diplomacy and development assistance, but also in combating insurgents and addressing broader security issues. The coordinated aid programs of the United States and its European allies focus on a wide range of activities from strengthening the central and local governments of Afghanistan and its security forces, to promoting civilian reconstruction, reducing corruption, and preparing for elections. This report examines the central role of UNAMA in Afghanistan. It discusses the obstacles the organization faces in coordinating international efforts and explores related policy issues and considerations for the 111th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation Mary Beth Nikitin Analyst in Nonproliferation
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its minimum credible deterrent is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Administrations proposed FY2010 defense budget requests $439.6 million in Air Force research and development funding to begin a new program for acquiring new 179 KC-X aerial refueling tankers. The 179 KC-X's, which could be procured at an annual rate of 12 to 18 aircraft and cost roughly $200 million each, would replace roughly one-third of the Air Forces aging fleet of KC-135 aerial refueling tankers. The Air Force and the U.S. Transportation Command state that replacing the KC-135s is their highest recapitalization priority. The two expected competitors for the KC-X program are Boeing, which is expected to offer a KC-X based on the Boeing 767 or Boeing 777 commercial airliner, and an industry team consisting of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADSthe parent company of Airbus), which is expected to offer a KC-X based on the Airbus A330 commercial airliner. A Boeing KC-X would be assembled in Seattle, while a Northrop/EADS KC-X would be assembled in Mobile, AL. The administrations proposed new KC-X program follows previous unsuccessful attempts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to implement a KC-X acquisition program for replacing the KC- 135s. The history of those earlier attempts forms an important part of the context for the Administrations proposed new KC-X program, particularly in terms of defining the capabilities that are needed in the KC-X and designing and conducting a fair competition between aircraft offered by Boeing and Northrop/EADS. The issue for Congress in FY2010 is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administrations request for FY2010 research and development funding for the new KC-X program, and whether to take any action to define the acquisition strategy for the new KC-X program. Key acquisition-strategy issues include whether to procure one KC-X design or two, and (if only one design is to be procured, as the Administration prefers), how to structure and conduct the competition for determining the winning design. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their markups of the FY2009 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390), both recommend approving the Administrations request for $439.6 million in research and development funding for the KC-X program. Section 1044 of H.R. 2647 would repeal Section 1081 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), which directed the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a pilot program of at least five years duration to assess the feasibility and advisability of utilizing commercial fee-for-service air refueling tanker aircraft for Air Force operations. Section 1058 of S. 1390 would amend Section 1081 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), to make changes intended to facilitate the implementation of a fee-for-service air refueling support pilot program.
China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy
Given its relatively low savings rate, the U.S. economy depends heavily on foreign capital inflows from countries with high savings rates (such as China) to help promote growth and to fund the federal budget deficit. China has intervened heavily in currency markets to limit the appreciation of its currency, especially against the dollar. As a result, China has become the worlds largest and fastest growing holder of foreign exchange reserves (FER). China has invested a large share of its FER in U.S. securities, which, as of June 2008, totaled $1.2 trillion, making China the second largest foreign holder of U.S. securities (after Japan). These securities include long-term (LT) Treasury debt, LT U.S. agency debt, LT U.S. corporate debt, LT U.S. equities, and short-term debt. It is likely that China became the largest foreign holder of U.S. securities by the end of 2008. From June 2002 to June 2008, China's holdings of U.S. securities increased by over $1 trillion–far more than that of any other nation. U.S. Treasury securities are issued to finance the federal budget deficit. Of the public debt that is privately held, a little more than half is held by foreigners. As of May 2009, China's Treasury securities holdings were $802 billion, accounting for 24.3% of total foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, making it the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries (it replaced Japan as the largest foreign holder in September 2008). The current global financial crisis has raised considerable concern in the United States over the willingness of foreigners, including China, to continue to invest in U.S. securities, particularly Treasury securities, which will be used to help finance U.S. spending programs intended to promote economic recovery. During her first visit to China in February 2009, Secretary of State Clinton urged China to continue to buy U.S. Treasury Securities. In March 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that he was a little worried about the safety of China's asset holdings in the United States. In addition, some Chinese government officials have called for replacing the dollar as the worlds main foreign reserve currency. Given the sharp decline in China's net exports and foreign direct investment flows into China (major sources of Chinas foreign exchange reserves), it is not clear how much new U.S. debt China will purchase in the months ahead. Data from the Department of Treasury indicate that in recent months China has sought to reduce its holdings of LT U.S. agency debt, while increasing its holdings of short-term U.S. Treasury securities deemed by China to be more safe and secure. Some analysts contend that China might decide to unload a large share of its U.S. securities holdings, which could induce other foreign investors to sell off their U.S. holdings as well. Such a move could lead to a sharp depreciation of the dollar in international markets and force the United States to raise interest rates, which could significantly dampen U.S. economic growth, all else equal. Other observes counter that it would not be in China's economic interest to suddenly sell off its U.S. investment holdings. Doing so could lead to financial losses for the Chinese government, and any shocks to the U.S. economy caused by this action could ultimately hurt China's economy as well. The issue of China's large holdings of U.S. securities is part of a larger debate among economists over how long the high U.S. reliance on foreign investment can be sustained, to what extent that reliance poses risks to the economy, and how to evaluate the costs associated with borrowing versus the benefits that would accrue to the economy from that practice.
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress
Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress–the Gang of Eight–when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. In approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, Congress said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those rare cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of its intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, Congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible. In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to Committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements. On July 8, 2009, the executive branch issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) in which it stated that it strongly objected to the House Committees action to replace the Gang of Eight statutory provision, and that the Presidents senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act if the Committees language was retained in the final bill. The White House has not yet issued an SAP regarding the Senate Intelligence Committees version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act. With Congress considering a possible change, this report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight.
Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Policy toward and support for Taiwan are a key element in U.S. relations with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and an important component of U.S. policy in Asia. Official U.S. relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan became a casualty of the U.S. decision to recognize the PRC government as China's sole legitimate government. Since then, unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan have been built on the framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRAP.L. 96-8) and shaped by three U.S.-PRC communiqus. Under these, the United States maintains official relations with the PRC, but continues to have unique and critical interests in Taiwan, including significant commercial ties, objections to PRC threats to use force against Taiwan, arms sales and security assurances, and support for Taiwans democratic development. U.S. policy today remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the status quo between Taiwan and the PRC. But other factors have changed dramatically since 1979, including growing PRC power and importance, Taiwans democratization, and the deepening of Taiwan-PRC economic and social linkages. These changes have led to periodic discussions about the efficacy of current U.S. policy and whether or not it should be reviewed or changed. Taiwans current president, Ma Ying-jeou, elected in March 2008, moved quickly to jump start Taiwan-PRC talks that had been stalled since 1998. The talks to date have yielded a number of agreements, including agreements to establish regular direct weekend charter flights, direct sea and air transportation, postal links, and food safety mechanisms. Taiwan also has lifted long-standing caps on Taiwan investment in the PRC and lowered the profile of its bids for participation in U.N. agencies. These and other initiatives are welcomed by many as having contributed to greater regional stability. More pessimistic observers see growing PRC-Taiwan ties eroding U.S. influence, strengthening PRC leverage and, particularly in the face of expanding economic links, jeopardizing Taiwan autonomy and economic security. The changing dynamic between Taiwan and the PRC poses increasingly difficult, competing policy challenges for the United States. Along with new policy challengessuch as what U.S. policy should be if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRCthe Obama Administration will be faced with other challenges familiar from past years, including decisions on new arms sales to Taiwan, which are anathema to the PRC; how to accommodate requests for visits to the United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the overall nature of U.S. relations with the Ma government; whether to pursue closer economic ties with Taiwan; what role, if any, Washington should play in cross-strait relations; and more broadly, what form of defense assurances to offer Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan government also is seeking to raise its international profile in other ways involving the United States. Taiwan is seeking to be removed from the U.S. Special 301 Watch List for intellectual property rights violations, and is seeking to qualify for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries. The Taiwan government also continues to ask for a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which would broaden the current avenue for U.S.- Taiwan trade discussions, the 1994 Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA). Legislation in the 111th Congress concerning Taiwan includes H.Con.Res. 18, urging that the United States resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and H.Con.Res. 55, expressing U.S. support for and commitment to Taiwan. This report will be updated as events warrant.