The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq
The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq has been relatively peaceful and prosperous since the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, the Iraqi Kurds' political autonomy, and territorial and economic demands, have caused friction with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other Arab leaders of Iraq, and with Christian and other minorities in the north. Turkey and Iran were skeptical about Kurdish autonomy in Iraq but have reconciled themselves to this reality and have emerged as major investors in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Superimposed on Kurd-Arab di Despite limited agreements allowing for new oil exports from the Kurdish region, the major outstanding issues between the Kurds and the central government do not appear close to resolution. Tensions have increased now that Kurdish representation in two key mixed provinces has been reduced by the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. The disputes have nearly erupted into all-out violence between Kurdish militias and central government forces in mid-2009, potentially undermining the stability achieved throughout Iraq in 2008 and causing the U.S. military to propose new U.S. deployments designed to build confidence between Kurdish and government forces. The Obama Administration has not, to date, indicated that the Kurdish-central government disputes would derail or delay a major drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq between now and August 2010. However, many Kurds believe that the drawdown will reduce the U.S. political influence over the Kurds and the central government that is needed to contain these disputes. At the same time that it is at odds with the central government, the Kurdish region itself is in political ferment. The Kurdish region voted for president and for members of the Kurdistan National Assembly on July 25, 2009. The results, in which an opposition list won almost 25% of the vote, has threatened the previously iron grip on the politics and economy of the region exercised by the two main factions–the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. For more on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
United States Fire Administration: An Overview
The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA)–which includes the National Fire Academy (NFA)–is currently an entity within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The objective of the USFA is to significantly reduce the nation's loss of life from fire, while also achieving a reduction in property loss and non-fatal injury due to fire. The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329)–which contained the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act–provided $44.979 million for USFA. Meanwhile, the United States Fire Administration Reauthorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 4847/S. 2606) was signed into law on October 8, 2008 (P.L. 110-376). The Administration's FY2010 budget proposal requested $45.588 million for USFA, an increase of 1.3% from the FY2009 level. The House and Senate-passed FY2010 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill (H.R. 2892) provided $45.588 million for USFA, the same level as the Administration's proposal. In the 111th Congress, debate over the USFA budget focuses on whether the USFA is receiving sufficient funding to accomplish its mission, given that appropriations for USFA have consistently been well below the agency's authorized level. An ongoing issue is the viability and status of the USFA and National Fire Academy within the Department of Homeland Security. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
The Obama Administration is facing a security environment in Iraq vastly improved over that which prevailed during 2005-2007, although still not completely peaceful or without potential to deteriorate significantly. The overall frequency of violence is down to post-Saddam low levels, yet, since May 2009, insurgents have increased high profile attacks and the Obama Administration appears increasingly concerned about Iraq's ability to maintain security. However, these attacks did not derail the June 30, 2009, U.S. withdrawal of combat troops from major cities and have not, to date, caused a modification of the February 27, 2009, announcement by President Obama that all U.S. combat brigades would be withdrawn by August 31, 2010. This would leave a residual presence of 35,000Œ50,000 U.S. trainers, advisers, and mentors, with these to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. The drawdown is in line with a U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement” that took effect January 1, 2009. Despite the fact that recent high profile attacks have not stimulated a return to sectarian warfare in Iraq, some U.S. officials believe that a U.S. military presence might be needed beyond 2011 to ensure further political progress and produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. Others worry that the many remaining political disputes among Iraqi factions could escalate and reignite civil conflict if violence continues to increase; this concern was a theme of the three day visit to Iraq by Vice President Biden during the July 4, 2009, weekend. The political disputes were a factor in the competition for January 31, 2009, provincial elections, and are continuing as Iraq heads toward the next national elections in January 2010. The provincial elections went ahead peacefully and produced a victory for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his allies, but also exposed splits between Maliki and other erstwhile Shiite allies. The elections also exacerbated tensions between the Iraqi Kurds and Maliki over Kurdish demands for control of disputed areas. The security progress in 2008 and 2009 came after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Hussein's regime, only for Iraq to be wracked by a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs–without clear movement toward national political reconciliation–stimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, U.S. economic and security aid to Iraq has been reduced since FY2008. For further information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
Access to Government Information In the United States
The U.S. Constitution makes no specific allowance for any one of the three branches of the federal government to have access to information held by the others. No provision in the U.S. Constitution expressly establishes a procedure for public access to government information. Congress has legislated various public access laws. Among these laws are two records access statutes, • the Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act or FOIA; 5 U.S.C. § 552), and • the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), and two meetings access statutes, • the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. App.), and • the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. § 552b). The American separation of powers model of government may inherently prompt interbranch conflicts over the accessibility of information. These conflicts are neither unexpected nor necessarily destructive. Although there is considerable interbranch cooperation in the sharing of information and records, such conflicts over access may continue on occasion. This report offers an overview of the four information access laws noted above, and provides citations to additional resources related to these tools.
Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response: The SAFER Grant Program
In response to concerns over the adequacy of firefighter staffing, the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Act–popularly called the “SAFER Act”–was enacted by the 108th Congress as Section 1057 of the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136). The SAFER Act authorizes grants to career, volunteer, and combination local fire departments for the purpose of increasing the number of firefighters to help communities meet industry minimum standards and attain 24-hour staffing to provide adequate protection from fire and fire-related hazards. Also authorized are grants to volunteer fire departments for activities related to the recruitment and retention of volunteers. The SAFER grant program is authorized through FY2010. With the economic turndown adversely affecting budgets of local governments, concerns have arisen that modifications to the SAFER statute may be necessary to enable fire departments to more effectively participate in the program. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) included a provision (section 603) that waives the matching requirements for SAFER grants awarded in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32) included a provision authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive further limitations and restrictions in the SAFER statute for FY2009 and FY2010. Because of the statutory modifications made to SAFER's applicant eligibility criteria in the ARRA and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, the FY2009 SAFER application round is expected to commence later in the year than usual, likely sometime in the fall of 2009. For FY2010, the Obama Administration proposed $420 million for SAFER, double the amount appropriated in FY2009. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have also approved $420 million for SAFER in FY2010. The budget proposal for SAFER is likely to receive heightened scrutiny, given the national economic downturn and local budgetary cutbacks that many fire departments are now facing. Concerns over local fire departments' budgetary problems may also frame debate over the SAFER reauthorization bill, which is expected to be considered during the 111th Congress. Congress will likely consider whether some SAFER rules and restrictions governing the hiring grants should be permanently eliminated or altered in order to make it economically feasible for more fire departments to participate in the program. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Assistance to Firefighters Program: Distribution of Fire Grant Funding
The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program, also known as fire grants or the FIRE Act grant program, was established by Title XVII of the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). Currently administered by the Grant Programs Directorate of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the program provides federal grants directly to local fire departments and unaffiliated Emergency Medical Services (EMS) organizations to help address a variety of equipment, training, and other firefighter-related and EMS needs. A related program is the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters (SAFER) program, which provides grants for hiring, recruiting, and retaining firefighters. The fire grant program is now in its ninth year. Over $4.8 billion has been appropriated to the fire grant program since FY2001. The Fire Act statute was reauthorized in 2004 (Title XXXVI of P.L. 108-375) and provides overall guidelines on how fire grant money should be distributed. There is no set geographical formula for the distribution of fire grants–fire departments throughout the nation apply, and award decisions are made by a peer panel based on the merits of the application and the needs of the community. However, the law does require that fire grants be distributed to a diverse mix of fire departments, with respect to type of department (paid, volunteer, or combination), geographic location, and type of community served (e.g. urban, suburban, or rural). On February 17, 2009, the President signed P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. The ARRA included an additional $210 million in firefighter assistance grants for modifying, upgrading, or constructing state and local non-federal fire stations, provided that 5% be set aside for program administration and provided that no grant shall exceed $15 million. The application period for Assistance to Firefighters Fire Station Construction Grants (SCG) grants opened on June 11 and will close on July 10, 2009. For FY2010, the Obama Administration is proposing $170 million for fire grants, a 70% decrease from the FY2009 level, and $420 million for SAFER, double the amount appropriated in FY2009. The total amount requested for firefighter assistance (AFG and SAFER) is $590 million, a 24% decrease from FY2009. The House-passed FY2010 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill (H.R. 2892) provided $810 million for firefighter assistance, including $390 million for AFG and $420 million for SAFER. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2892 also provided $810 million for firefighter assistance, including $390 million for AFG and $420 million for SAFER. The Obama Administration's FY2010 budget proposal for firefighter assistance is likely to receive heightened scrutiny from the fire community, given what was viewed as inadequate past budget proposals by the Bush Administration, and given the national economic downturn and local budgetary cutbacks that many fire departments are now facing. Meanwhile, reauthorization legislation for AFG and SAFER will be introduced into the 111th Congress. Debate over the AFG reauthorization is likely to reflect a competition for funding between career/urban/suburban departments and volunteer/rural departments. The urgency of this debate will be heightened by the probable reduction of overall AFG funding in FY2010, and the economic downturn in many local communities increasingly hard pressed to allocate funding for their local fire departments. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress
During the past two decades, while U.S. oil imports and consumption have steadily risen, oil spill incidents and the volume of oil spilled have not followed a similar course. In general, the annual number and volume of oil spills have shown declines–in some cases, dramatic declines. The 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaskan waters played a large role in stimulating actions that contributed to this trend, particularly the decrease in the annual spill volumes. The Exxon Valdez spill highlighted the need for stronger legislation, inflamed public sentiment, and spurred Congress to enact comprehensive oil spill legislation, resulting in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-380). This law expanded and clarified the authority of the federal government and created new oil spill prevention and preparedness requirements. Moreover, the 1990 legislation strengthened existing liability provisions, providing a greater deterrent against spills. After 1990, spill volume from oil tankers, the vessels that carry and have spilled the most oil, decreased significantly. Considering that U.S. oil consumption and oil imports have steadily increased, the trend of declining spill incidents and volume in past years is noteworthy. Yet, recent annual data indicate that the overall decline of annual spill events may have stopped. Although Energy Information Administration projections indicate that oil imports are expected to decline in coming years, the United States is projected to continue importing a substantial percentage of the oil it consumes. The threat of oil spills raises the question of whether U.S. officials have the necessary resources at hand to respond to a major spill. There is some concern that the favorable U.S. spill record has resulted in a loss of experienced personnel, capable of responding quickly and effectively to a major oil spill. Prior to actions by the 109th and 110th Congresses, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund was particularly vulnerable to a large and costly spill: Fund managers had projected the fund would be completely depleted by FY2009. Recent legislative developments have increased the oil spill liability limits and raised the tax rate that feeds into the trust fund. With these changes in effect, the most recent projection indicates that the fund will reach almost $1.5 billion by the end of FY2009 and crest $3.5 billion by FY2016. Although the trust fund is now less vulnerable to a major spill, some degree of exposure still remains, thus raising a central policy debate: How should policymakers allocate the costs associated with a major, accidental oil spill? For example, what share of costs should be borne by the responsible party (e.g., oil vessel owner/operators), the oil industry, and the general treasury? No oil spill is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spill, depending on the timing and location, can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwelling and intertidal species, and organisms in early developmental stages–eggs or larvae–are especially vulnerable to a nearby spill. However, the effects of oil spills can vary greatly. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from only a few days to several years, or even decades in some cases. This report reviews the history and trends of oil spills in the United States; identifies the legal authorities governing oil spill prevention, response, and cleanup; and examines the threats of future oil spills in U.S. coastal waters.
Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community's efforts since 1995 to stabilize Bosnia are beginning to come apart. They noted that the downward trend has been especially evident since 2006, with the election of leaders with starkly divergent goals. Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous “entities” within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to make Bosnia's central government more effective and has at times asserted the RS's right to secede from Bosnia. On the other hand, Haris Silajdzic, a member of the central government collective presidency from the Bosniak ethnic group, has condemned the Republika Srpska as an illegitimate product of genocide. He has called for the abolition of the entities and a dominant central government. Efforts to reform Bosnia's constitution have made little progress. There has been a debate about the future role of the international community in Bosnia. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. An EU peacekeeping force, called EUFOR, is charged with keeping the peace in Bosnia and overseeing the Bosnian armed forces. The international community has vowed to close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of reform objectives, ending direct international oversight. After OHR's closure, international support for Bosnian reforms would be limited to aid and advice from the United States, European Union, NATO, and other institutions, with the prospect of eventual NATO and EU membership. An EU Special Representative (EUSR) would remain in Bosnia, although the post would likely have a smaller staff than OHR. In addition, it would likely be limited to an advisory and reporting role, lacking OHR's powers to veto legislation and remove local officials. There has been pressure within the EU to scale back EUFOR, which has a current strength of about 2,100 troops. Citing the improved security situation in Bosnia, France and other EU countries have called for EUFOR to be sharply reduced in size and limited to an advisory function. A decision on the plan may be made before the end of 2009. Some observers are concerned that the combination of increasing internal tension within Bosnia and a declining international role could seriously set back over a decade of peace in Bosnia, perhaps leading to violence and the destabilization of the region as a whole. They call for greater international engagement in Bosnia, including an increase in EUFOR's capabilities and strong powers for the EUSR, if OHR leaves. The United States has strongly supported Bosnia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in recent years as the EU role has increased. In May 2009, the House passed H.Res. 171, which called for the Obama Administration to appoint a special envoy to the Balkans to re-energize the U.S. role.
Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements
Mexico has had a growing commitment to trade integration through the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) since the 1990s and its trade policy is among the most open in the world. Mexico's pursuit of FTAs with other countries not only provides economic benefits, but could also potentially reduce its economic dependence on the United States. The United States is, by far, Mexico's most significant trading partner. About 80% of Mexico's exports go to the United States and 49% of Mexico's imports come from the United States. Mexico's second largest trading partner is China, accounting for approximately 6% of Mexico's exports and imports. In an effort to increase trade with other countries, Mexico has a total of 11 trade agreements involving 41 countries. These include agreements with most countries in the Western Hemisphere including the United States and Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western Hemisphere and entered into agreements with Israel and the European Union in July 2000. Mexico also has an FTA with Japan. The large number of trade agreements, however, has not yet been successful in decreasing Mexico's dependence on trade with the United States. Economic motivations are generally the major driving force for the formation of free trade agreements among countries, but there are other reasons countries enter into FTAs, including political and security factors. One of Mexico's primary motivations for the unilateral trade liberalization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s was to improve economic conditions in the country, which policymakers hoped would lead to greater investor confidence and attract more foreign investment. Trade agreements were also expected to improve investor confidence, attract foreign investment, and create jobs. Mexico may have other reasons for entering into FTAs, such as expanding market access and decreasing its reliance on the United States as an export market. The slow progress in multilateral negotiations may also contribute to the increasing interest throughout the world in regional trade blocs. Some countries may see smaller trade arrangements as “building blocks” for multilateral agreements. Since Mexico began trade liberalization in the early 1990s, its trade with the world has risen rapidly, with exports increasing more rapidly than imports. Mexico's trade balance with all countries went from a deficit of $13.5 billion in 1993 to surpluses of $7.1 billion in 1995 and $6.5 billion in 1996. Since 1998, Mexico's trade balance has remained in deficit, reaching $17.5 billion in 2008. The trade balance with the United States went from a deficit of $2.4 billion in 1993 to a surplus of $82.0 billion in 2008. Exports to the United States increased 447% between 1993 and 2008, from $42.9 billion to $292.6 billion. Mexico's imports from the United States increased 237% during the same time period, from $45.3 billion to $152.6 billion. In the 110th Congress, issues of concern related to the trade and economic relationship with Mexico involved mostly economic conditions in Mexico, issues related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the effect of NAFTA on Mexico, and Mexican migrant workers in the United States. The 111th Congress will likely maintain an active interest concerning Mexico on these issues. This report provides an overview of Mexico's free trade agreements, its motivations for trade liberalization and entering into free trade agreements, and some of the issues Mexico faces in addressing its economic challenges. This report will be updated as events warrant.
FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues
Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on the House-passed and Senate passed-versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. It includes background information and a discussion of the issue, along with a table that contains a comparison of the bill (H.R. 2647) passed by the House on June 25, 2009, and the version of this bill passed by Senate on July 23, 2009. A third column will be completed after action on a final version by both chambers. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. Note: some issues were addressed in the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL34590, FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by Lawrence Kapp, concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report RL34590 are designated with a “*” in the relevant section titles of this report. This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation.
Interrogation of Detainees: Requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act
U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations has been a subject of long-standing debate, including whether such treatment complies with U.S. statutes and treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT). In response to this controversy, Congress approved additional guidelines concerning the treatment of detainees via the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which was enacted pursuant to both the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148, Title X), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, Title XIV). Among other things, the DTA contains provisions that (1) require Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and (2) prohibit the “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government.” These provisions of the DTA, which were first introduced by Senator John McCain, have popularly been referred to as the “McCain Amendment.” This report discusses provisions of the DTA concerning standards for the interrogation and treatment of detainees. This report discusses the application of the DTA by the DOD in the updated 2006 version of the Army Field Manual, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. In addition, the report discusses the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) (P.L. 109-366), which contains provisions that reference or amend the DTA. It also addresses the Executive Order issued by President Barack Obama that generally instructs all U.S. agencies to comply with Army Field Manual requirements when interrogating persons captured in an armed conflict. The report also discusses the recommendations made by the Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer established by the Executive Order, and the DTA's relevance in the event of the prosecution of U.S. personnel for authorized interrogation or detention activities. For discussion of the provisions in the DTA that limit judicial review of challenges to U.S. detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Kenneth R. Thomas, and Michael John Garcia. Several legislative proposals were introduced during the 110th Congress that referenced or modified the DTA's requirements relating to the treatment and interrogation of detainees, including H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which was vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008, and House-passed H.R. 4156, the Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008. Both bills would have barred the CIA and other intelligence agencies from employing any interrogation tactic that is not authorized by the Army Field Manual. Similar proposals have been introduced in the 111th Congress. It remains to be seen whether President Obama's recent Executive Order on detainee treatment will affect congressional interest in passing further legislation affecting U.S. interrogation policy.
Intelligence Authorization Legislation: Status and Challenges
Since FY2005, no annual intelligence authorization bill has been enacted. Although the National Security Act requires intelligence activities to be specifically authorized, this requirement has been satisfied in recent years by one-sentence catch-all provisions in defense appropriations acts authorizing intelligence activities. This procedure meets the statutory requirement but has, according to some observers, weakened the ability of Congress to oversee intelligence activities. Annual intelligence authorization acts were first passed in 1978 after the establishment of the two congressional intelligence committees and were enacted every year until 2005. These acts provided specific authorizations of intelligence activities and were accompanied by reports that provided detailed guidance to the Nation's intelligence agencies. However, in practice, the absence of intelligence authorization acts has meant that key intelligence issues have been addressed in defense authorization acts and defense appropriations acts that focus primarily on the activities of the Department of Defense. Several Members have maintained that this procedure has been characterized by misplaced priorities and wasteful spending estimates that could run into billions. One example is the eventual cancellation of a highly classified and very costly overhead surveillance system that had been approved without support from the two intelligence committees. Some also argue that the ability to link together the collection and analytical efforts of intelligence agencies must extend well beyond the Defense Department given the challenges of the 21st century and that intelligence authorization legislation is essential to ensure the effectiveness of this linkage. When Congressional approval of intelligence programs is limited to defense authorizations and appropriations legislation, the result arguably can be an overemphasis on military missions by the Intelligence Community. Other observers counter, however, that, even without intelligence authorization acts, Congress makes its views known to the Intelligence Community and that defense authorization and appropriations acts provide adequate legislative authority for major acquisition efforts of agencies that are in large measure integral parts of the Defense Department.
The Global Economic Downturn and Protectionism
In today's severe global economic downturn, concerns are being raised that countries may try to improve their own trade positions in order to help domestic industries at the expense of others by imposing measures that artificially increase their exports or restrict imports. Such efforts are considered by some to be a form of “protectionism” and are often referred to as beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This report develops three scenarios to approximate different dimensions of the relationship between the global economic downturn and protectionism. The scenarios are not predictions, but descriptions of how and why pressures for protection could be manifested and transmitted under different circumstances and assumptions. Under a low impact scenario, existing World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and obligations, bolstered by a high level of global interdependence, discourage trade restrictions and trade diverting measures from being proposed. If implemented, the measures conform to WTO rules and/or have a limited impact on trade flows. Recent reports issued by the WTO and World Bank provide preliminary support for this scenario. Under a medium impact scenario, WTO rules are violated or are disregarded due to the exigencies of the economic crisis and demands to provide financial rescue plans for the banking and auto sectors. As a result, trade and investment flows over time could be diverted or fall outside WTO surveillance, thereby weakening the global trading system. Under a high impact scenario, WTO rules are violated, major trade conflict occurs, and the world trading system is undermined. This threat arises from the longstanding presence of large trade imbalances driven by distorted global consumption and savings patterns–patterns that were an underlying cause of the global economic downturn. Given the prominent role that China and the United States play in the global imbalances, two flashpoints for any outbreak of protectionism can be identified. The first could stem from U.S. public concerns that other countries are gaining a “free ride” in terms of international efforts to increase aggregate spending and get the world economy growing again. The second could arise if China and other surplus countries try to avoid massive factory closings and layoffs by exporting their overcapacity to the United States and Europe with trade policy measures such as export subsidies and currency depreciation. Three broad policy challenges for Congress are derived from the analysis. The first deals with international surveillance of fiscal stimulus programs. The second relates to multilateral surveillance of trade pressures and barriers proposed and adopted during the economic crisis. The third pertains to the joint management of U.S. trade relations by Congress and the administration, particularly as it bears on responding to constituent requests for protection, facilitating the adjustment of current account surplus countries, and formulating trade liberalization priorities.
Identity Theft: Trends and Issues
In the wake of the economic downturn, policymakers are increasingly concerned with securing the economic health of the United States–including combating those crimes that threaten to further undermine the nation's financial stability. Identity theft is one such crime. It is the fastest growing type of fraud in the United States; in 2008 about 9.9 million Americans were reportedly victims of identity theft, an increase of 22% from the number of cases in 2007. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that it costs consumers about $50 billion annually. Identity theft is often committed to facilitate other crimes such as credit card fraud, document fraud, or employment fraud, which in turn can affect not only the nation's economy but its security. Consequently, in securing the nation and it's economic health, policymakers are also tasked with reducing identity theft and its impact. Congress continues to debate the federal government's role in (1) preventing identity theft and its related crimes, (2) mitigating the potential effects of identity theft after it occurs, and (3) providing the most effective tools to investigate and prosecute identity thieves. With respect to preventing identity theft, one issue concerning policymakers is the prevalence of personally identifiable information–and in particular, the prevalence of social security numbers (SSNs)–in both the private and public sectors. One policy option to reduce their prevalence may involve restricting the use of SSNs on government-issued documents such as Medicare identification cards. Another option could entail providing federal agencies with increased regulatory authority to curb the prevalence of SSN use in the private sector. In debating policies to mitigate the effects of identity theft, one option Congress may consider is whether to strengthen data breach notification requirements. Such requirements could affect the notification of relevant law enforcement authorities as well as any individuals whose personally identifiable information may be at risk from the breach. There have already been several legislative and administrative actions aimed at curtailing identity theft. Congress enacted legislation naming identity theft as a federal crime in 1998 (P.L. 105-318) and later provided for enhanced penalties for aggravated identity theft (P.L. 108-275). In April 2007, the President's Identity Theft Task Force issued recommendations to combat identity theft, including specific legislative recommendations to close identity theft-related gaps in the federal criminal statutes. In a further attempt to curb identity theft, Congress directed the FTC to issue an Identity Theft Red Flags Rule (effective November 1, 2009), requiring that creditors and financial institutions with specified account types develop and institute written identity theft prevention programs. Multiple federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Postal Inspection Service; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, are involved in investigating identity theft. Further, prosecutions and convictions of identity theft and aggravated identity theft cases have continued to increase since becoming federal crimes. In line with this trend, there has been a general increase in the number of identity theft complaints to the FTC as well in the number of reported data breaches placing personally identifiable information at risk. This report will be updated as needed.
Energy and Water Development: FY2010 Appropriations
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. Key budgetary issues for FY2010 involving these programs may include: • the distribution of Corps appropriations across the agency's authorized planning, construction, and maintenance activities (Title I); • support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California “Bay-Delta” (CALFED) and San Joaquin River (Title II); • funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); • several new initiatives proposed for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III); and • Funding decisions in DOE's Office of Environmental Management. Energy and Water Development funding for FY2009 was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, the “Stimulus” Act, P.L. 111-5) included funding for numerous programs in the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Department of Energy, to be expended in FY2009 and FY2010.